5444182026-10-105444182026-10-10in-capmkt:AdoptionOfNewLinesOfBusinessMemberiso4217:INROSWALPUMPSOSWAL PUMPS LIMITED544418NOTLISTEDINE0BYP01024Arrangement/Adoption of new line/Closure of operations (Sub-para 2-Para B)Adoption of new line(s) of businessNewtrue2026-10-1016:45:0017:30:002026-10-10Solar Cell ManufacturingThe binding constraint for Oswal Solar’s module business is the solar cell, not the frame. Standalone module makers face acute difficulty securing Domestic Content Requirement (DCR) cells from domestic cell manufacturers because (i) long-term contracts are offered only at elevated prices even though cell prices are reasonably likely to soften, and (ii) very large deposits are demanded to secure them. This puts both availability and cost of the key input outside the Company's control - a strategic exposure for a business anchored to DCR-dependent programmes (PM-KUSUM, PM Surya Ghar). Backward integrating into cell manufacturing directly addresses this. It secures supply, insulates Oswal Solar from spot-price and deposit demands, deepens value addition from module assembly into cell manufacturing, and is expected to strengthen the group's cost structure, competitive positioning in Government-backed programmes, and profitability at the consolidated level over time. The change re-directs scarce IPO capital from a low value-add, deferrable component (frames), surplus module capacity, and surplus EVA encapsulant capacity to the highest leverage point in the chain (cells), where control of supply is now business-critical. It is also relevant to note that the proposed cell plant is intended for captive consumption. At a capacity of 1.2 GW, it will meet approximately 75% of the Company’s overall cell requirement, with the balance continuing to be sourced externally in the near term. Potential benefits of the solar cell plant: • Versus further module capacity: the Oswal Solar’s existing and planned module lines (the ~570 MW line plus the 1 GW now being set up) are sufficient for current requirements; adding further module capacity would deepen, not reduce, the Company's exposure to externally-sourced, DCR-constrained cells. • Versus continuing the Aluminium Frame Facility: frames are a commoditised, low value-add component that can be sourced from the market in the interim and the frame technology itself is in flux, carrying a real risk of stranded or mis-specified capex; cells, by contrast, are the binding constraint on both supply security and margin, and are the highest-leverage point in the value chain. • Versus building out the balance of the EVA Encapsulant Facility: the 1.2 GW of EVA capacity being retained is majorly sufficient to service the Company's module-manufacturing capacity with only a small incremental quantum expected to be sourced externally; committing capital to the balance 300 MW would tie up funds in an encapsulant-manufacturing step that is not the binding constraint on the Company's solar-manufacturing economics, unlike cells. Across all three sources, the common thread is that each represents capital committed to a lower-value-add or currently adequate part of the value chain, whereas the cell plant addresses the single most capital-scarce and strategically urgent gap in the Company's integrated solar-manufacturing operations. Concentrating the re-purposed proceeds into Oswal Solar’s equity contribution is therefore expected to be more value-accretive than continuing to fund incremental module capacity or the conventional aluminium-frame line.4558500000