



May 27, 2026

The BSE Ltd. 1 st Floor, New Trading Wing, Rotunda Building Phiroze Jeejeebhoy Towers, Dalal Street, Fort Mumbai – 400001 Scrip Code: 532884	The National Stock Exchange of India Ltd. Exchange Plaza, 5 th Floor, C – 1, Block G Bandra – Kurla Complex, Bandra (E) Mumbai – 400051 Symbol: REFEX
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Ref.: Regulation 30 and 47 of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 (“SEBI Listing Regulations”).

Subject: Publication of Extracts of the Audited Financial Results, both standalone & consolidated basis, for the 4th quarter and financial year ended March 31, 2026, in Newspapers.

Dear Sir(s)/ Madam,

This is further to our earlier announcement dated May 26, 2026, we hereby submit the copies of the extracts of the Audited Financial Results, both standalone & consolidated basis, for the 4th quarter and financial year ended March 31, 2026, published in the following newspapers, as per the requirements of Regulation 47 of the SEBI Listing Regulations:

1. Business Standard (All Editions dated May 27, 2026) – English
2. Dinamani (All Editions dated May 27, 2026) – Tamil.

It may be noted that the Audited Financial Results for 4th quarter and financial year ended March 31, 2026, have been considered and approved by the Board of Directors of the Company, at its meeting held on May 26, 2026 and were submitted to the stock exchanges, i.e., the BSE Limited and National Stock Exchange of India Limited, on the same day.

Kindly take the above information on your records

Thanking you,

Yours faithfully,

For **Refex Industries Limited**

Ankit Poddar
Company Secretary & Compliance Officer
ACS-25443
Place: Chennai

Refex Industries Limited
A Refex Group Company

CIN: L45200TN2002PLC049601

OPINION

Not the BoP but structural

The concluding part of a series explores why India's medium-term real growth prospects are less robust than what the headline GDP numbers indicate



ABHISHEK ANAND, JOSH FELMAN AND ARVIND SUBRAMANIAN

India is experiencing a rupee or, more broadly, a balance of payments (BoP) problem, according to several commentators. They should instead ask how such pressure is even conceivable when India is apparently growing at a foreign capital-salvaging rate of 7-plus per cent, with a healthy financial system, low inflation, a modest current account deficit and \$700 billion in official reserves.

In our previous column, published on May 25, we argued that the short-term challenge in the wake of the ongoing energy shock is an inability to get two key prices to adjust: Those of energy, historically difficult because of heavy and consistent subsidisation, and the exchange rate because of a repudiation of a long-and successful policy. Could the current crisis also reflect something more fundamental?

One piece of evidence is that the rupee was among the most affected emerging market currencies in the period preceding the war. Figure 1 plots the currency decline of selected countries against the dollar on the x-axis and the extent of intervention by central banks to prevent a downward adjustment. Since Covid, between January 2022 and February 2026, the rupee declined by over 20 per cent, the highest among comparator countries. And the sting in the tail is that this decline occurred despite central bank sales of over 45 per cent of foreign currency assets, which is also the highest among these countries. These numbers do not include the Reserve Bank of India's sizable forward intervention on which exceeded \$60 billion. Fleeing foreign investors are sending a strong




FIGURE 1: Currency decline and central bank intervention, Jan 2022-Feb 2026




FIGURE 2: Global export share, manufacturing and labour-intensive services, 2001-25 (%)





FIGURE 3: Private corporate investment, 2001-2025 (% of GDP)



signal at a time of apparently strong growth.

Clearly, investors seem to believe that India's medium-term real growth prospects are less robust than the headline GDP numbers indicate. Why? One engine of long-run growth is labour-intensive manufacturing (including electronics) and India's performance has been poor in the last 15 years, reflected in a declining global market share from already low levels (Figure 2). The Trump tariffs and geopolitical uncertainty have only added to that long-term weakness, reinforcing doubts about India being able to exploit the China Plus One opportunity and revive its manufacturing

sector. India has managed to reinvest its electronics sector on the back of luring Apple but that risks being an isolated case rather than the opening of the floodgate to manufacturing investment.

Services have done better but there are mounting concerns about the impact of AI on this successful growth engine. The iconic companies that drove the early IT boom have been shedding labour. The more recent and dynamic global capability centres seem to specialise in activities, some of which seem eminently replaceable by AI. Of course, even if high-skill services were successful it would not

generate inclusive growth. These anxieties about medium-term growth are captured in one key indicator — how much private companies, large and small, actually invest. As Figure 3 shows, this peaked at 17 per cent of GDP in the early 2000s and today is at half that amount share. There was a brief post-Covid blip but that has faded. Weak private investment is the key problem for the Indian economy and reviving it is the challenge.

To its credit, the government has taken action to reduce the costs of doing business. It has enacted a slew of reforms, including labour law simplification, opening up to foreign direct

investment (FDI), and above all by negotiating a free trade agreement with the European Union and provisionally agreeing a trade deal with the United States.

But investors' doubts have not been dispelled. Actions that affect the costs of doing business have been taken on paper. The bigger problem is the deeper instincts of the government that affect the risks of doing business on the ground. That is the key distinction to understanding weak private investment. These instincts include: Tilt the regulatory playing field in favour of a few large corporate houses at the expense of other investors, domestic and foreign; tilting the playing field in favour of some states against others; weaponising the state's coercive apparatus to target political opponents and businesses; overzealously and arbitrarily implementing tax laws; and undermining India's federal decision-making structures.

The government could signal more fundamental change in two ways. First, it must become more open and realistic about acknowledging the ongoing challenges. Second, it must recruit fresh talent, prized for its quality and independence, not loyalty.

For instincts to change a pre-requisite is for people to change. Finding competent, credible and fresh interlocutors may be the need of the moment.

Abhishek Anand is a visiting Fellow, Madras Institute of Development Studies; Josh Felman is principal, JH Consulting; and Arvind Subramanian is senior fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics

OPINION

India's policy mix needs a rethink

One root cause of rupee weakness is distortions that deter capital flows



ANANTH NARAYAN

Recent movements in the rupee warrant attention, but not overreaction. Even after the sharp rise in energy prices, economists expect India's current account deficit in FY27 to settle at around 2-3 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP). This is manageable by historical standards. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) also holds foreign exchange reserves of around \$80 billion net of forward foreign currency sales.

However, there are important policy takeaways. India needs sustained net foreign capital inflows, which ultimately require growth and innovation. But we must also recognise the linkages between interest rates, taxation, and the external balance — and how they shape capital formation.

Sentiment, fear, greed

For some time now, the rupee has been weighed down by negative sentiment. Across FY25 and FY26, the RBI sold \$92 billion of foreign exchange in spot and forward markets. Yet India's 'core' balance of payments deficit, across current account deficit, net foreign direct investment, and net equity foreign portfolio investment, was only around \$80 billion.

Around \$12 billion of RBI foreign exchange sales therefore supported not the core deficit, but additional hedging and speculative demand for foreign currency. There was a spiralling 'fear-plus-greed' trade against the rupee.

Any moderation in oil prices and geopolitics can trigger a short-term recovery in the rupee. However, there are broader issues that predate the Iran conflict. Durably reversing the negative sentiment is a prerequisite to attracting sustained capital flows.

How free are our debt markets?

Ultimately, capital flows will chase credible growth and innovation in manufacturing and services. Much will also depend on the global environment. But there are important lessons for macroeconomic policy.

Interest rates, currency markets, and capital flows are deeply interconnected, though policy debates often treat them as separate silos. There is much debate on whether the rupee should act as a free

'shock absorber', but far less on how free our interest rate markets are.

Consider the policy mix over the last two years. Net external outflows drained deposits and liquidity from the banking system. Ordinarily, in response, interest rates would have risen to retain deposits. Instead, with inflation moderating, policy rates were cut by 125 basis points since early 2023 to 5.25 per cent. Simultaneously, the RBI injected enormous durable liquidity through large government bond purchases and a reduction in the cash reserve ratio, and not just through short-term measures.

In FY26 alone, RBI net bond purchases amounted to a record ₹88 trillion, or 85 per cent of net Central government borrowing. Aided by this, despite record high gross Central state borrowing of ₹27 trillion, the 10-year government bond yield briefly fell to 6.25 per cent. The India-US 10-year yield spread compressed to a low 1.5-2.5 percentage points.

Effectively, RBI bond purchases helped refill a banking system that was losing deposits to the external sector, while keeping rates low. The policy intent was understandable: Support growth amid low inflation. But with the external balance under pressure, money kept leaking out, leaving banks still scrambling for durable deposits.

From interest rate to currency markets

Lower interest rates worsened the external imbalance in at least three ways.

First, narrower interest rate differentials between the rupee and the US dollar made it harder to attract foreign debt flows, given the balance of payments was already under pressure. Instead, domestic investors were incentivised to move into foreign assets.

Second, amid increasing awareness of equity markets, persistently low post-tax interest income pushed discretionary household savings away from debt into equities. This has stunted the development of debt markets, such as price controls suppress supply responses in any market. Simultaneously, strong domestic flows into equities from retail investors outpaced fresh supply, creating pockets of overvaluation. Given such overvaluation, foreign investors remained net sellers of equity, further worsening the external balance.

Third, lower interest differentials compressed dollar-rupee forward premia. During much of 2024 and 2025, one-year dollar-rupee forward premia fell to a historically low 1.5-2.5 per cent.

Hedgers and speculators could then buy dollar one-year forward against the rupee by just paying 2 per cent over the prevalent dollar-rupee spot rate. With actual rupee depreciation rapidly outpacing that, this fuelled the spiralling 'fear-plus-greed' trade against the rupee.

None of this is to imply that intervention in markets is wrong. Markets generate crucial price signals and adjustment incentives, but in a world of frequent market failures, policy-makers should not be dogmatic. But every intervention has its inevitable side-effects. As argued earlier, even with low inflation, intervention to keep interest rates low at a time of external imbalance and negative sentiment can end up weakening capital formation — the opposite of what was intended. Any sizeable intervention, therefore, must be preceded by a holistic consideration of consequences, and modulated if unintended outcomes emerge. The current monetary policy framework does not undertake such a holistic consideration of 'impossible trinity': the deep connect between interest rates, capital flows, and exchange rates.

INDIA'S MONETARY POLICY FRAMEWORK MUST ENGAGE HOLISTICALLY WITH THE IMPOSSIBLE TRINITY: ACROSS INTEREST RATES, CAPITAL FLOWS, AND EXCHANGE RATES

What should be done now?

First, there is no case for panic. Reorienting to capital controls, even if temporary, risks damaging investor confidence. Far better to use our meaningful buffers to positively address root causes.

Second, India's taxation needs reform. India is an outlier in taxing foreign investors on source-based capital gains. Moving towards a residence-based regime would align India with global practices and remove a major irritant for much-needed foreign capital.

Third, a less punitive tax regime on domestic fixed income would allow for low interest rates, while drawing more savings into debt. This would help grow India's underdeveloped debt markets, reduce undue financialisation, and moderate any equity overvaluation. All this should help draw foreign investors into both debt and equity markets.

Finally, India's monetary policy framework must engage holistically with the 'impossible trinity' across interest rates, capital flows, and exchange rates. These trade-offs do not arise only during crises. Even in normal times, intervention choices in one market inevitably shape outcomes in others. Complexity in markets cannot be wished or legislated away.

The writer is a former whole-time member of Sebi

Reflex Industries Limited

Reflex Industries Limited is a dynamic, diversified enterprise with strategic interests in coal and ash management, clean mobility, and renewable energy. We are committed to sustainability, innovation, and long-term value creation across sectors critical to India's growth.

◆ 23+ Years of Excellence ◆

Ash Utilization & Coal Handling

Venwind Reflex (WTG)

Enterprise Mobility Solution

CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHTS

Q4FY26

₹ 96,519	₹ 14,383	₹ 9,444	₹ 2,41,163
Revenues (₹ in Lakhs)	EBITDA (₹ in Lakhs)	PAT (₹ in Lakhs)	Revenues (₹ in Lakhs)

Yearly

₹ 30,423	₹ 20,372
EBITDA (₹ in Lakhs)	PAT (₹ in Lakhs)

Extract of Audited Financial Results for the Quarter and Year ended on March 31, 2026 (₹ in Lakhs)

S. No.	Particulars	Standalone						Consolidated					
		Quarter Ended		Year Ended		Quarter Ended		Year Ended					
		Mar 31, 2026 (Audited)	Dec 31, 2025 (Audited)	Mar 31, 2025 (Audited)	Mar 31, 2026 (Audited)	Mar 31, 2025 (Audited)	Mar 31, 2026 (Audited)	Dec 31, 2025 (Audited)	Mar 31, 2025 (Audited)	Mar 31, 2026 (Audited)			
1	Total Income from Operations	70,207.32	58,325.89	61,231.38	2,07,458.93	2,45,001.63	96,519.10	61,134.42	62,775.93	2,41,163.69	2,46,766.32		
2	Profit/(Loss) before exceptional and extraordinary items and taxes	13,154.37	8,865.43	7,173.85	33,289.04	24,068.72	13,229.16	6,948.26	5,951.74	27,747.11	19,991.35		
3	Profit/(Loss) before taxes (after exceptional and extraordinary items)	13,154.37	8,865.43	7,173.85	33,289.04	24,068.72	13,229.16	6,948.26	5,951.74	27,747.11	19,991.35		
4	Profit/(Loss) after taxes (after exceptional and extraordinary items)	9,395.86	6,690.64	5,709.10	24,586.69	18,941.13	9,444.51	5,271.32	4,792.19	20,372.10	15,838.34		
5	Total Comprehensive Profit/(Loss) for the period	9,514.37	6,681.12	5,644.92	24,778.48	18,876.40	10,224.45	5,316.97	4,647.04	21,514.94	15,693.00		
6	Paid-up Equity Share Capital (face value of Rs.2/- each)	2,743.99	2,742.59	2,583.65	2,743.99	2,583.65	2,743.99	2,742.59	2,583.65	2,743.99	2,583.65		
7	Reserve (excluding revaluation reserve)	NA	NA	NA	1,54,423.62	1,22,439.28	NA	NA	NA	1,47,671.20	1,18,695.76		
8	Basic Earnings per share	6.85	4.89	4.42	18.47	15.46	6.62	3.94	3.74	15.28	12.96		
9	Diluted Earnings per share	6.78	4.84	4.19	18.25	14.81	6.54	3.89	3.49	15.06	12.33		

Notes:

- The above is an extract of the detailed format of quarterly and year ended financial results as on March 31, 2026 filed with the Stock Exchange under Regulation 33 of the SEBI (LODR) Regulations, 2015. The full format of the Financial Results is available on the Stock Exchange websites (www.bseindia.com & www.nseindia.com) and on the Company website (www.reflex.co.in).
- The Financial results of the Company have been prepared in accordance with the Indian Accounting Standards (IND-AS) notified under Section 133 of the Companies Act, 2013.
- Figures have been re-grouped/re-classified/restated to make them comparable to the figures wherever necessary.
- The above audited results were reviewed by the Audit Committee and approved by the Board of Directors in the meetings held on May 26, 2026.
- The Board of Directors of Reflex Industries Limited has recommended a final dividend of Rs. 1/- per equity share having a face value of Rs. 2 each for the Financial Year 2025-26, subject to the approval of the shareholders.

Place: Italy
Date: May 26, 2026

Reflex Industries Limited
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By Order of the Board
For Reflex Industries Limited

Anil Jain
Managing Director
DIN: 00181960

