



February 26, 2026

The Corporate Relationship Department
BSE Limited,
P.J. Towers, Dalal Street,
Mumbai- 400001
Scrip Code: 500089

The Calcutta Stock Exchange Ltd.
71 Lyons Range,
Kolkata- 700001
Scrip Code: 10013217

National Stock Exchange of India Limited,
Exchange Plaza, 5th Floor, Plot No. C/1, G Block,
Bandra Kurla Complex,
Bandra (E), Mumbai – 400051
Scrip Code: DICIND

Subject: Newspaper Advertisement for publication of Financial Results for the quarter and year ended 31.12.2025.

Ref: Regulation 47 of SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015

Dear Madam/Sir,

Please find enclosed herewith copies of the Newspaper Advertisement published by the Company in the Newspaper i.e., Business Standard (English Language) and Aajkaal (Regional Language) on February 26, 2026, regarding publication of Financial Results of the Company for quarter and year ended 31.12.2025.

This is for your kind information and records.

Thanking You,
Yours Faithfully,

For and on behalf of:
DIC India Limited

Meghna Saini
Company Secretary & Compliance Officer
Membership No. A-42587

DIC INDIA LIMITED

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Punching above weight

Island states are trying to shape maritime power in the Indian Ocean

MOHAMMAD ASIF KHAN
New Delhi, 25 February

In August 1810, at the height of the Anglo-Napoleonic wars, a small French fleet based in Mauritius did something unexpected: It defeated the mighty British Royal Navy.

The British force was larger and better armed. But French Commodore Jacques Hamelin and Captain Guy-Victor Duperré knew the waters.

Using reefs, narrow channels, and local knowledge, they slipped past Captain Samuel Pym's squadron and forced a rare defeat on what was then the world's most powerful navy.

The battle showed something that still matters in the Indian Ocean: Control is not only about ships and firepower. It is about access, geography, and who understands the sea the best.

That lesson has not aged: More than two centuries later, India and China compete for influence in the Indian Ocean region, a place which has traditionally been seen as an area of Indian influence. In this setting, Mauritius, Seychelles and the Maldives carry weight that far exceeds their size.

India shifted from a passive role to a muscular one in the 1980s, spurred by its Operation Cactus to thwart a coup attempt against President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom in the Maldives in 1988. It has engaged similarly in Seychelles and Mauritius over the years to enforce its role as the "net security provider" in the region.

However, that has changed in recent years. Long subservient to the big powers, these island states are now asserting themselves over port access, defence cooperation and overall maritime dominance in the Indian Ocean region.

Small is big

The region is home to some of the world's most vital sea links between Europe, Africa, and Asia. Access to or control of these exclusive economic zones (EEZs) contributes to world trade patterns, including energy resources necessary to sustain South and East Asia.

And with the rise of China, these island-nations have shown a willingness to diversify their security partners.

"The biggest mistake would be assuming that India has a sphere of influence over these countries," David Brewster, senior research fellow at the Australian National University's Security College, said. "They do not want to be within anyone's sphere of influence; they want to pursue their own destiny and development objectives."

This became evident in late 2023 when Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu openly declared that he would reduce India's military presence on the island. The build-up followed an "India out" campaign — something that surfaces sporadically in Maldivian politics. Dattesh Parulekar, assistant professor at the School of International Studies, University of Goa, cited the Maldives campaign as an example of how island-states are behaving.

"Muizzu's disparaging remarks against India's regional leadership, for instance, were twinned with a visible outreach to China, prompting speculation about deeper Chinese involvement in the Maldives' maritime infrastructure," Parulekar said.

India responded calmly to the incident. At the same time, by signalling a stronger maritime posture in the Indian Ocean, including enhanced activity and importance around Lakshadweep, India made it clear that excessive Chinese alignment would have strategic consequences.

But, importantly, India avoided coercion. Instead of exploiting the Maldives' financial vulnerabilities, India rescheduled loans and helped create a soft landing.

This approach has paid dividends: The rhetoric of Maldivian leaders softened, Indian investment resumed, and a limited Indian defence presence was accepted.

"These island states are acutely aware that they are small players in a much larger geopolitical contest. None of them wants to be caught between India and China," Parulekar added.

Although China is considered a new player in the region, its footprint actually goes back centuries. It is the only country that has embassies in all the major Indian Ocean island-states — the Maldives, Mauritius, Madagascar, Sri Lanka, Comoros, and Seychelles.

Beyond diplomatic engagement, China offers economic and infrastructure support to these countries through its Belt and Road Initiative. In March 2024, the Maldives signed a military assistance agreement with China. China has also provided financial cooperation agreements and credit lines.

Two visions

However, China's "debt trap diplomacy", where Beijing provides excessive loans to financially vulnerable countries to extract financial and political leverage in case of failure of payment, has already gripped many states in the region.

In 2017, Sri Lanka had to hand over its strategic Hambantota port to a Chinese state-owned company on a 99-year lease because it could not pay the debt it took to build the port.

"There is more awareness now of the potential pitfalls of Chinese engagement, but smaller states need as many development options as possible; by necessity, this includes China," Nalathi Samaranyake, adjunct fellow at the US-based think-tank East-West Center, said.

As China's footprint expands in the region, India's approach, by contrast, has been more incremental and relationship-driven. While India has also invested in infrastructure, the emphasis has been more on capacity building, maritime domain awareness, disaster relief management and governance cooperation.

In March 2025, Prime Minister Narendra Modi inaugurated the Mahasagar (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions) doctrine, which focuses on security, regional cooperation and sustainable growth.

However, India's biggest advantage in the region is not infrastructure or finance — it is people. Nearly two-thirds of the population in Mauritius is of Indian origin. In Seychelles, there is a strong business and professional community of people of Indian origin, while the Maldives, despite not having a large settled diaspora, has longstanding people-to-people links through tourism, trade, education, and medical travel. India has developed joint surveillance arrangements for exclusive economic zones, conducted hydrographic activity, and trained personnel from island-states in coastal security and maritime operations.

It also has some strategic assets in the region. In Seychelles, India operates a naval facility and a network of radar systems across islands like Mahe, Alphonse, and Assumption Island to combat piracy and maritime traffic.

On Mauritius's Agalega Island, India has developed a 3,000 metre airstrip and surveillance facilities. In the Maldives, India operates a chain of coastal surveillance radar stations along the archipelago. After a brief period of unrest in 2024, Indian military personnel were replaced by civilian ones, but the infrastructure remains integral to the regional security grid.

India's Minicoy island near Maldives remains crucial for maintaining surveillance in the Arabian Sea. "India's attention to

environmental security in the Indian Ocean is more comprehensive than what China currently offers," Samaranyake said.

But India also faces internal capacity limits and industrial bottlenecks, even as China rapidly expands its maritime capabilities. The result is a subtle but significant difference in engagement style.

China leans on large-scale economic inducements and infrastructure access, while India emphasises sustained cooperation and mutual capacity enhancement.

"In regions where China is known for speed, delays can damage goodwill; timely execution is India's strongest currency," Parulekar said. "India's initiatives must be need-based, environmentally conscious, and financially viable. This approach reassures island states and helps dilute, though not eliminate, China's growing influence in the Indian Ocean."

To be sure, the powerplay in the Indian Ocean cannot be solely viewed through the lens of India-China rivalry. The US remains a key player in the region. It operates one of its most strategic bases, Diego Garcia, jointly with the UK, giving it strategic reach from West Asia to East Asia.

The ousted islanders of Diego Garcia (Chagos Islands) have waged a long-running court battle to reclaim their strategically significant island, which currently serves as an important Western airbase. This campaign is not only supported by Mauritius, which used to have sovereignty over the island until the British evicted native islanders, but by India as well, which has long backed Mauritian sovereignty.

India's role was acknowledged by the Mauritian Prime Minister in March 2025 when he publicly thanked Modi and awarded him The Grand Commander of the Order of the Star and Key of the Indian Ocean, Mauritius' highest civilian honour.

Russia, an unlikely player, will also gain access to the Indian Ocean with a planned base in Port Sudan. In addition, Russian ships can use Indian bases for refuelling, repair, and logistical services through the RELOS (Reciprocal Exchange of Logistics Support) pact, signed in February 2025.

Leverage and challenges

For India, this new multipolarity presents both opportunities and disadvantages.

One of the best examples of this is the Maldives.

Thanks in part to economic aid, as well as currency exchange agreements, India has managed to calm the Maldivian storm.

Mauritius is another case where an island state is leveraging its strategic location to enter into defence partnerships with big powers.

In March 2025, India upgraded its partner-



Vice Admiral Tarun Sobti (right), Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, Indian Navy, with Major General Ibrahim Hilmy, Chief of Defence Force, Maldives, during an official visit to the Male in December 2025

PHOTO: INDIAN NAVY

CHINA IS THE ONLY COUNTRY THAT HAS EMBASSIES IN ALL THE MAJOR INDIAN OCEAN ISLAND STATES — THE MALDIVES, MAURITIUS, MADAGASCAR, SRI LANKA, COMOROS, AND SEYCHELLES

ship with Mauritius to a more comprehensive strategic partnership, which primarily focused on military partnerships, combined maritime observation, and capacity building according to Mauritius' specifications.

This included support for the development of a National Maritime Information Sharing Centre as well as increasing cooperation on hydrography and emergency operations.

In Seychelles, Indian assistance includes the transfer of coastguard boats and the provision of coastal radar and training services aimed at helping the Seychelles

government monitor its EEZ.

Island states' leverage in the Indian Ocean is not only about geopolitics; it is also rooted in non-traditional security challenges that shape national priorities. Rising sea levels, extreme weather events, and the vulnerability of economic infrastructure make climate resilience a central concern for the Maldives, Seychelles, and others.

India's attention to these issues, from disaster relief to coastal surveillance and capacity building, is widely appreciated by the Indian Ocean partners. Mauritian Prime Minister Navinchandra Ramgoolam hailed India as a "first responder" for its rapid humanitarian aid following Cyclone Chido in Agaléga in early 2025. Analysts point out that this emphasis on environmental and human security matters greatly to littoral states, perhaps more than abstract great-power competition.

"Island states are on the frontlines of deal-

Indian diaspora

Country	Indian-origin population	% of total population
Seychelles	10,000 Indo-Seychellois	8 to 9
Maldives	29,000 Indians (mostly NRIs)	5.6 (2022 est)
Mauritius	812,769 Indo-Mauritians	70 (2026 est)

Sources: Indian; Seychelles and Maldives govt agencies

ing with environmental challenges. India's attention to non-traditional security threats like cyclones and flooding is greatly appreciated by smaller Indian Ocean countries," Samaranyake said.

Two centuries after the Battle of Grand Port, the lesson endures. In the Indian Ocean, it is not only fleets and firepower that matter but the ability to develop people-to-people links and maintain a strategic vision. The islands still hold the key.

Indian Institute of Management Ranchi
LIMITED TENDER NOTICE
IIM Ranchi invites e-bids for the 'Procurement of Desktop Computers' through the e-tender portal. The last date for submission of e-bids is 11.03.2026 by 03:00 PM. For more details, please refer to our institute website: www.iimranchi.ac.in

Indian Institute of Management Ranchi
VERY SHORT TENDER NOTICE
IIM Ranchi invites tenders from public sector banks and eligible private sector banks for 'Interest Rates on Fixed Deposit for IIM Ranchi'. The last date for submission of sealed bids is 03/03/2026 by 12:30 PM. For more details, please refer to our institute website: www.iimranchi.ac.in

Sealed tender in W.B. Form No. 2911(ii) are invited by the Executive Engineer, Bankura Division, P.W.D. from Bonafide outsider having 40% credential in a single work of similar nature of P.W.D for Short N.I.T. No. 01 of 2025-2026 for 16 (Sixteen) nos. works in connection with the Emergent Construction Of Temporary Kitchen / Dining Shed, Along With Allied Work For Accommodation Of CAPF Deployed During The WB Assembly Election- 2026 circulated vide this office memo no. 2921 dated, 25.02.2026. detailed may be seen at <http://www.wbpwd.gov.in> and from the notice board of the office of undersigned. Last date of Application, Permission and Receipt of tender documents are 27.02.2026, 27.02.2026 and 27.02.2026 respectively. For more information, the interested agencies may contact the office of the undersigned on any working day at working hours.
Sd/-
Executive Engineer,
Bankura Division P.W.D.

SUNDARAM MUTUAL — Sundaram Finance Group —
Notice-Cum-Addendum to the Scheme Information Document (SID) And Key Information Memorandum (KIM) of Schemes of Sundaram Mutual Fund ('Fund')

Change in the address of Customer Care Centre:
Investors / Unit holders are advised to take note of the change in address of the Customer Care Centre of KFIN Technologies Limited as stated below, which is an official point of acceptance of transactions for the Schemes of Sundaram Mutual Fund:

Branch	Existing Address	New Address	Effective Date
Dhule	KFin Technologies Limited Ground Floor, Ideal Laundry, Lane No.4, Khol Galli, Near Muthoot Finance, Opposite New Bhavsar General Store, Parola Road, Dhule-424001, Maharashtra © Telephone: 02562-282823	KFin Technologies Limited House No.1676, Lane No.-5, Hindu Ekta Chowk, Beside HDB Finance Services, Opposite Satish Tailor, Dhule-424001 Maharashtra. © Telephone: 02562-282823	27-Feb-2026

All other terms and conditions of the Scheme Information Document(s) / Key Information Memorandum(s) / Statement of Additional Information will remain unchanged.
This addendum forms an integral part of the Scheme Information Document (SID) / Key Information Memorandum (KIM) / Statement of Additional Information (SAI) of the schemes of Sundaram Mutual Fund as amended from time to time.
For Sundaram Asset Management Company Ltd
R Ajith Kumar
Company Secretary & Compliance Officer
Place: Chennai
Date: February 26, 2026

For more information please contact:
Sundaram Asset Management Company Ltd
(Investment Manager to Sundaram Mutual Fund)
CIN: U93090TN1996PLC034615

Corporate Office: 1st & 2nd Floor, Sundaram Towers, 46, Whites Road, Royapettah, Chennai-14.
Contact No. (India) 1860 425 7237, (NRI) +91 40 2345 2215
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No. 21, Patuillos Road, Chennai 600 002.

Regd. Office: 1st & 2nd Floor, Sundaram Towers, 46, Whites Road, Royapettah, Chennai-14.

Mutual Fund Investments are subject to market risks, read all scheme related documents carefully.

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Email id: investors@dic.co.in • Website: www.dic.co.in

STATEMENT OF UNAUDITED FINANCIAL RESULTS FOR THE QUARTER AND YEAR ENDED ON DECEMBER 31, 2025
(Rs. in lakhs except per share data)

Particulars	Quarter ended December 31, 2025	Quarter ended September 30, 2025	Corresponding quarter ended December 31, 2024	Year ended December 31, 2025	Year ended December 31, 2024
	(Unaudited)	(Unaudited)	(Unaudited)	(Unaudited)	(Audited)
Total income from operations (net)	23,193.07	22,316.99	21,921.64	89,178.85	88,152.89
Net Profit/ (Loss) for the period (before Tax, Exceptional and/ or Extraordinary items)	856.40	793.28	862.76	2,601.11	2,515.06
Net Profit/ (Loss) for the period before tax (after Exceptional and/ or Extraordinary items)	619.95	793.28	931.91	2,364.66	2,589.58
Net Profit/ (Loss) for the period after tax (after Exceptional and/ or Extraordinary items)	455.64	587.00	714.85	1,737.66	1,953.90
Total Comprehensive Income for the period [Comprising Profit/ (Loss) for the period (after tax) and Other Comprehensive Income (after tax)]	470.67	571.71	692.12	1,706.80	1,892.71
Equity Share Capital	917.90	917.90	917.90	917.90	917.90
Reserves (excluding Revaluation Reserve as shown in the Balance Sheet of Previous year)	-	-	-	41,946.90	40,607.26
Earnings per Share (of Rs. 10/- each) (for continuing and discontinued operations)					
1. Basic	4.96	6.40	7.79	18.93	21.29
2. Diluted	4.96	6.40	7.79	18.93	21.29

Notes:
1 The above is an extract of the detailed format of Quarterly Financial Results filed with the Stock Exchanges under Regulation 33 of the SEBI (Listing and Other Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015. The full format of the Quarterly/ Annual Financial Results are available on the Stock Exchange websites and are also available on Company's website at https://dic.co.in/sites/default/files/2026-02/Publication_sd.pdf which can be accessed by scanning the Quick Response code provided below:
2 The above unaudited financial results for the quarter and year ended December 31, 2025 have been duly reviewed by the Audit Committee and were taken on record by the Board of Directors at its meeting held on February 24, 2026. As required in terms of Regulation 33 of the SEBI (Listing Agreement and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations 2015, the same have been subjected to Limited Review by the Statutory Auditors.
3 Figures for the previous periods have been regrouped / rearranged wherever necessary to conform to current period's classification.

By Order of the Board
Sd/-
Manish Bhatia
Managing Director and CEO

Date : February 24, 2026

